By Ben Lando
Iraq Oil Report
December 26, 2012
About a year after leaving his post as National Security Adviser to President Barack Obama, Gen. (Ret.) James Jones was tapped to lead a U.S. business trade group focused on increasing ties with Iraqi Kurdistan.
The United States-Kurdistan Business Council (USKBC) officially launched in April 2012. Jones has become a strong proponent of "energy security" as a strategic U.S. foreign policy objective, having served in positions at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and now the Bi-Partisan Policy Center.
During his military career, he served as the commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps and the supreme allied commander of NATO.
In a recent interview with Iraq Oil Report, Jones discussed his frustration with U.S. policy toward Iraq, which he says is giving Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki a pass.
He also calls on the U.S. government to get behind ExxonMobil and other American oil companies in their quest to partner with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to build an oil sector in northern Iraq.
Ben Lando: I want to talk about U.S. investment interests in Iraqi Kurdistan and go over the related issues. But first, how and why did you get involved with the USKBC?
Gen. James Jones: Twenty-One years ago, in 1991, I was a colonel and I commanded a Marine expeditionary unit just after the Gulf War, and we were on a 6-month deployment in the (Mediterranean). And around February of 1991 we got an emergency mission to proceed to the Turkish port of Iskenderun and to report to the commanding general of Operation Provide Comfort. And I had no idea what that was. We were following the news a little bit and we knew a little bit about post-Iraq, post-Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Some problem in Kurdistan, in northern Iraq, with the Kurds and the refugees and things like that.
Anyway, we were actually doing an operation in Sardinia and we proceeded to the port, walked in and reported to an Air Force two-star and he basically said, "We have 750,000 refugees in southern Turkey, they were stampeded by Saddam Hussein." They believed they were gonna be attacked by chemical weapons again, biological weapons. They literally ran out of their homes and ran to the border, and when they got to the other side of the border there were Turks. Turkish authorities forced them up into the mountains as opposed to down in the valleys. And they had no food, no clothes, and they were dying at the rate of hundreds a day.
I happenned to have about 23 helicopters with us, and there were supplies in an airfield in a Turkish town on the border called Silopi. And by sundown the next day, we were delivering humanitarian aid to the various (landing zones) where there were, in fact, close to a million people that were suffering a great deal. Not only did they not have food, but they didn't even have shelter; they didn't have clothing for their extreme climate. So it was a pretty tense situation.
Long story short, we wound up staying there for about four of five more months until, in fact, we were able to push Saddam's secret police and military 30 kilometers south of the border. We picked 30 kilometers cause that was kind of their artillery range. And once the Kurds saw that, they agreed to come out of the mountains temporarily and stayed in some of the refugee camps that the (U.S. Navy) Seabees built – but essentially repopulated the area.
With the no-fly zone both in the north and the south, Saddam Hussein's forces never came back. And that led to, kind of, the creation of what is mostly called Kurdistan. So my interest there was humanitarian. I got to know all the Kurdish leaders, met with them many, many times and over the years. I've kept in general touch with them periodically, and as I transitioned from my active duty days to working at the U.S. Chamber (of Commerce) for almost two years, and then two years in the White House, I rejuvenated my contacts and tried to restart something that we tried to do in the U.S. Chamber from '07 to '08 – to stimulate American presence in Kurdistan, where they are welcome.
This has been kind of a passion of mine, especially as, in my view, Prime Minister Maliki is showing a different reaction than we hoped for in terms of the liberation of Iraq. But Kurdistan has been a consistent friend and ally. So this is embryonic, but it's the right thing to do, I think. And it's good to see American companies competing successfully in northern Iraq, even if they're being impeded from doing so by the government in Iraq itself.
BL: What should the U.S. government then be doing to encourage business development in Kurdistan?
JJ: We've had a "One Iraq" policy. I think it was noble to think that the government of Iraq would be appreciative of the resources, the sacrifices that we've made in blood and treasure. I personally think that appreciation has been lacking. They could've shown their appreciation in ways that would've been helpful to American companies, instead of being difficult to work with and unhelpful. The flirtations with Iran are certainly not what we expected.
So the one constant in Iraq has been the KRG and its appreciation for what Americans have done for the Kurds since 1991, and I'm glad to see American companies being able to benefit from that. I would've liked to have seen all of Iraq kind of be like that, to be honest with you. But maybe by doing something economically powerful in Kurdistan, that will have a forcing function on the government in Baghdad to kind of say, "You know what? We need more American companies to come into Iraq."
BL: At some point, given the tensions between the KRG and Baghdad, it's difficult to cultivate a relationship with the north without alienating the south. How how far should the U.S. go in writing off the rest of Iraq?
JJ: Well I don't think we should write them off but I think that if you don't like the behavior of a government that is, frankly, in my view, not showing a respect or appreciation for our sacrifice – and the opportunity that has been given to Iraqis, of all manner and shape and stripe – then you have to do the next-best thing. And that's to go where you're welcome.
And frankly the United States hasn't discouraged us from doing this. The consul general is deeply involved in (the USKBC), and it's good business. It's secure, it's safe and frankly, if you told me 20 years ago that somehow Turkey and the Kurds would find some accommodation – which they have, centered around, of course, economic development – that's a good thing.
BL: The U.S. has embraced it in some respects – Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iraq Barbara Leaf was at the USKBC trade mission dinner in Erbil in October – but the U.S. has also taken a different tone with specific companies. They've said, "We don't want oil companies, American oil companies specifically, to be investing in Kurdistan before an oil law is passed." They took a somewhat strong tone with Hunt Oil, and now with Exxon, especially related to disputed territories.
JJ: It's a complex issue in the relationship because, you know, you've got this agreement on how the Kurds are supposed to get 17 percent of all revenues, and the Kurds are, you know, not happy with the way that Baghdad has been implementing that part of the agreement. So there's a little bit of a cat and mouse game being played here.
But Exxon and Chevron took a position that this was a better place for them and I think, based on what I've seen, they made the right decision. But I don't think the U.S. government objects with them or has strenuously objected one way or the other. I don't know that for a fact, but I think that both companies, and the others that are there – the Hillwoods, the Hesses, the Conoco-Phillips, a bunch of others – you know, all were pioneers in being among the first companies to go there and help develop the wealth that is contained in the region. So I don't see anything bad here, I think it's quite good.
And my hope is that Baghdad will take a look and say, "You know what, we need to do more of what they're doing." And if they did, I think Iraq would be much better off.
BL: Sure, but the likelihood is that that won't happen.
JJ: Probably not.
BL: So then what's the role of the U.S. government? In order to support American companies or organizations in Kurdistan, what does the U.S. need to do?
JJ: Well, I think one of the most stabilizing aspects of what's going on is the fact that American industry is involved. I think that in itself is a stabilizing influence on the region. And I don't think that the central government in Baghdad or the KRG are going to risk the economic potential that is there in the country and in the region to start some sort of conflict. I could be wrong. I see our presence as very stabilizing.
As a matter of fact, (Kurdistan) President (Massoud) Barzani told me specifically, it's almost a direct quote, that four American companies in Kurdistan are worth two army divisions. That's how much importance they ascribe to American presence in Kurdistan as a stabilizing, confidence-building presence. So the geostrategic implications of American business through USKBC going there is extremely useful, I think.
BL: The way it's been described to me also by Kurdish leaders, is that it gives them an insurance policy: there are no American bases in Kurdistan, even though they're welcome.
JJ: Yeah, you can call it what you want. I call it a stabilizing, reassuring aspect. The U.S. is conscious of the fact that you have some major, major companies, U.S. companies, going there, and the embassy has to provide for that. I mean that's part of our national policy.
BL: Provide for that?
JJ: To provide – to make sure, you know, they are not treated unfairly, that they're not thrown in jail, not on trial or, you know, they don't get subjected to things that they can't defend themselves over.
BL: But the U.S. warning to oil companies - especially to those that have signed the disputed territories - has been: "You're doing this solely at your own risk. This is legally questionable." They have been qualifying their backing. Is that just rhetoric, you think?
JJ: I think governments have to be careful in how they do things. I think the policy of the United States is still to try to work with the central government and try to convince them that there is a better way to do this. But absent that, you know, American companies, oil companies in particular, are well versed in assessing risk. Probably better at it than we are.
BL: The ExxonMobil deal specifically seemed to be a game changer in the history of Kurdistan and also for investment in the region. How would you characterize it?
JJ: When I took my first group (of potential investors) over to Kurdistan, frankly, out of possible 30 or 40 people only about 12 to 15 showed up because the others were unsure of what security was like in Kurdistan. Because they read what they read and then they, you know, think, "This place is...."
For the 13 or 14 who went there, they said, "Wow, this is great, you know?" And then they call all their friends and say, "Boy, you missed it, this is great!" So, once that word gets around, that America has been hampered by its "One Iraq" policy a little bit – and that's why we weren't out in Kurdistan.
As an American it really bothers me to see all these other countries roll in there and sign contracts and everything else when during the war they actually did nothing. They didn't even support us or help us. So it's, for me it's like riding the scale a little bit. And as I said, from an economic standpoint, from a geostrategic standpoint, this is the right thing to do.
BL: What you've been saying is that the "One Iraq" policy has proven to not be adequate for the U.S. interests, and especially for the Kurds. What specifically needs to change and what has been asked for by President Barzani during his visits here with the leadership?
JJ: The "One Iraq" policy is what it is. It's up to the administration, the State Department, to decide whether that's working or not. I'm disappointed in it, to be honest with you.
I thought that we would, you know, have been able to create something that would be far more democratic, in terms of their orientation – in other words, in terms of how they feel about us after everything that's been done. But the behavior of a government which supports, throws its support towards a guy like Assad in Syria and obviously has close dealings with Tehran. That doesn't reflect, I think, either respect or appreciation for what was done. So I'm not wild about the "One Iraq" policy in that respect.
I think it was a good thing to try to do, but if it's not working, then you have to kind of switch vectors and try something that will work. And I think encouraging American business to deal with Iraq is okay. I think calling attention to the opportunities in different regions is also okay, and I think that if you have a particularly welcoming region, like Kurdistan, that's okay as well. And it's a semi-autonomous region; they'll work that out with Baghdad as to what that means and how that's implemented, but I don't have any problem with what we're doing.
In my trip to Turkey, in talking to the Turkish government's most senior officials, they think the American presence in northern Iraq is also a stabilizing function – our economic and presence and presence of business.
BL: They also think that Exxon's there because the U.S. government wants Exxon to be there.
JJ: There will be people who will make that connection. I'm not sure that's the case, but I'm glad they're there.
BL: I'm told the Obama administration is reviewing their policy in Iraq right now.
JJ: Good. You know, if you're gonna sell (Baghdad) F16s and M1 tanks and things like that while they're cozying up to Tehran, you're basically, probably, providing for a transfer of technology that is not in our best interest. I'm of the opinion that we need to hold our horses a little bit and work a little bit more with this Iraqi government to see what their real colors are.
BL: So the U.S. should stop short of supporting an independent Kurdistan?
JJ: No. I don't think that the U.S. should get into advocating for an independent Kurdistan – you know, a breakaway state. I don't think the Kurds are gonna even try that for a long time to come, if ever. But I think that the semi-autonomous regions that they set up has to be an opportunity for us to be able to deal with those regions. I mean, whether it’s the Shiite, or the Sunnis or the Kurds.
BL: In terms of U.S. energy security and U.S. global energy interests, how does Iraq, and the KRG specifically, fit into that policy?
JJ: Iraq will be the one to determine that. But, you know, it's not a good sign for the global community when companies like Exxon and Chevron both kind of say, "It's easier to do business in Kurdistan than it is with Baghdad." That has a chilling effect, you know, globally. And I think Baghdad's gonna have to learn from that.
Energy is a national security issue; it's an international security issue. We have leadership responsibilities in the globe. We are fortunate in this country to have an abundance of energy. We may not have enough of any one thing, but we have more than anybody else in just about everything. And I'm hopeful that getting a more strategic organization around the executive branch in particular, that we can capitalize on this and achieve our potential instead of just, kind of, stumbling around into it like we normally do because we don't have the organization that we need. I think that the U.S. dependence on oil is going to continue to go down as our ability to harvest our own resources increases, and I think that's a good thing.
BL: Does this put the U.S. in a foreign policy conundrum of conflicting priorities? In Kurdistan, there are companies, including major U.S. companies, who want to explore for oil and gas and get that out to the market, especially to Turkey and allies in Europe, especially the natural gas. Whereas the central government in Baghdad says, "Hold on a second, those contracts aren't legitimate."
JJ: We will enter into that discussion within a year, when Exxon and Chevron start producing oil, and then the pipeline system, such as it is, will prove itself to be inadequate. And those things are gonna have to be resolved among capitals, and so on and so forth. But it's obviously a looming problem, and a looming challenge.
But there are regional interests at stake with Turkey, a NATO ally, which wants to diversify its own energy, doesn’t want to be beholden to any one source of energy or to be able to be blackmailed by that source. You can't blame them for wanting to do that. That's something that the United States, as a global power, should respect – and frankly, assist an ally, in my view.
BL: Including direct pipelines?
JJ: In Turkey?
BL: In Turkey. There is very likely a conflict here: you have Turkey's interest, and what they would like in terms of a plentiful and diverse supply of energy; and you have Baghdad, which doesn't want direct pipelines to Kurdistan, especially if they are not under central government control.
JJ: Again, I think these are problems that are going to have to be resolved in capitals. Frankly, I think this matter is so important that ultimately a country like Turkey is going to do what's in its own best interest. They'll be patient with us, listen to us, and they'll say, "Okay, but here's what we're gonna do."
BL: What do you think that will be?
JJ: I think that ultimately they will build a pipeline. I think they will: it's in their national interest. I mean we wouldn't want somebody from across the ocean telling us we can't build a pipeline to Canada. Or from Canada to us. That's a sovereign decision.
There’s a lot of things that have to play out. My main hope would be that Baghdad would understand that their long-term interest lies more with economic dealings with the United States, on a level playing field – and would respect the fact that the Iranian threat is real, and makes their neighborhood much more dangerous. And that supporting dictators like Assad is pretty passé.
Iraq Oil Report
December 26, 2012
About a year after leaving his post as National Security Adviser to President Barack Obama, Gen. (Ret.) James Jones was tapped to lead a U.S. business trade group focused on increasing ties with Iraqi Kurdistan.
The United States-Kurdistan Business Council (USKBC) officially launched in April 2012. Jones has become a strong proponent of "energy security" as a strategic U.S. foreign policy objective, having served in positions at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and now the Bi-Partisan Policy Center.
During his military career, he served as the commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps and the supreme allied commander of NATO.
In a recent interview with Iraq Oil Report, Jones discussed his frustration with U.S. policy toward Iraq, which he says is giving Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki a pass.
He also calls on the U.S. government to get behind ExxonMobil and other American oil companies in their quest to partner with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to build an oil sector in northern Iraq.
Ben Lando: I want to talk about U.S. investment interests in Iraqi Kurdistan and go over the related issues. But first, how and why did you get involved with the USKBC?
Gen. James Jones: Twenty-One years ago, in 1991, I was a colonel and I commanded a Marine expeditionary unit just after the Gulf War, and we were on a 6-month deployment in the (Mediterranean). And around February of 1991 we got an emergency mission to proceed to the Turkish port of Iskenderun and to report to the commanding general of Operation Provide Comfort. And I had no idea what that was. We were following the news a little bit and we knew a little bit about post-Iraq, post-Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Some problem in Kurdistan, in northern Iraq, with the Kurds and the refugees and things like that.
Anyway, we were actually doing an operation in Sardinia and we proceeded to the port, walked in and reported to an Air Force two-star and he basically said, "We have 750,000 refugees in southern Turkey, they were stampeded by Saddam Hussein." They believed they were gonna be attacked by chemical weapons again, biological weapons. They literally ran out of their homes and ran to the border, and when they got to the other side of the border there were Turks. Turkish authorities forced them up into the mountains as opposed to down in the valleys. And they had no food, no clothes, and they were dying at the rate of hundreds a day.
I happenned to have about 23 helicopters with us, and there were supplies in an airfield in a Turkish town on the border called Silopi. And by sundown the next day, we were delivering humanitarian aid to the various (landing zones) where there were, in fact, close to a million people that were suffering a great deal. Not only did they not have food, but they didn't even have shelter; they didn't have clothing for their extreme climate. So it was a pretty tense situation.
Long story short, we wound up staying there for about four of five more months until, in fact, we were able to push Saddam's secret police and military 30 kilometers south of the border. We picked 30 kilometers cause that was kind of their artillery range. And once the Kurds saw that, they agreed to come out of the mountains temporarily and stayed in some of the refugee camps that the (U.S. Navy) Seabees built – but essentially repopulated the area.
With the no-fly zone both in the north and the south, Saddam Hussein's forces never came back. And that led to, kind of, the creation of what is mostly called Kurdistan. So my interest there was humanitarian. I got to know all the Kurdish leaders, met with them many, many times and over the years. I've kept in general touch with them periodically, and as I transitioned from my active duty days to working at the U.S. Chamber (of Commerce) for almost two years, and then two years in the White House, I rejuvenated my contacts and tried to restart something that we tried to do in the U.S. Chamber from '07 to '08 – to stimulate American presence in Kurdistan, where they are welcome.
This has been kind of a passion of mine, especially as, in my view, Prime Minister Maliki is showing a different reaction than we hoped for in terms of the liberation of Iraq. But Kurdistan has been a consistent friend and ally. So this is embryonic, but it's the right thing to do, I think. And it's good to see American companies competing successfully in northern Iraq, even if they're being impeded from doing so by the government in Iraq itself.
BL: What should the U.S. government then be doing to encourage business development in Kurdistan?
JJ: We've had a "One Iraq" policy. I think it was noble to think that the government of Iraq would be appreciative of the resources, the sacrifices that we've made in blood and treasure. I personally think that appreciation has been lacking. They could've shown their appreciation in ways that would've been helpful to American companies, instead of being difficult to work with and unhelpful. The flirtations with Iran are certainly not what we expected.
So the one constant in Iraq has been the KRG and its appreciation for what Americans have done for the Kurds since 1991, and I'm glad to see American companies being able to benefit from that. I would've liked to have seen all of Iraq kind of be like that, to be honest with you. But maybe by doing something economically powerful in Kurdistan, that will have a forcing function on the government in Baghdad to kind of say, "You know what? We need more American companies to come into Iraq."
BL: At some point, given the tensions between the KRG and Baghdad, it's difficult to cultivate a relationship with the north without alienating the south. How how far should the U.S. go in writing off the rest of Iraq?
JJ: Well I don't think we should write them off but I think that if you don't like the behavior of a government that is, frankly, in my view, not showing a respect or appreciation for our sacrifice – and the opportunity that has been given to Iraqis, of all manner and shape and stripe – then you have to do the next-best thing. And that's to go where you're welcome.
And frankly the United States hasn't discouraged us from doing this. The consul general is deeply involved in (the USKBC), and it's good business. It's secure, it's safe and frankly, if you told me 20 years ago that somehow Turkey and the Kurds would find some accommodation – which they have, centered around, of course, economic development – that's a good thing.
BL: The U.S. has embraced it in some respects – Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iraq Barbara Leaf was at the USKBC trade mission dinner in Erbil in October – but the U.S. has also taken a different tone with specific companies. They've said, "We don't want oil companies, American oil companies specifically, to be investing in Kurdistan before an oil law is passed." They took a somewhat strong tone with Hunt Oil, and now with Exxon, especially related to disputed territories.
JJ: It's a complex issue in the relationship because, you know, you've got this agreement on how the Kurds are supposed to get 17 percent of all revenues, and the Kurds are, you know, not happy with the way that Baghdad has been implementing that part of the agreement. So there's a little bit of a cat and mouse game being played here.
But Exxon and Chevron took a position that this was a better place for them and I think, based on what I've seen, they made the right decision. But I don't think the U.S. government objects with them or has strenuously objected one way or the other. I don't know that for a fact, but I think that both companies, and the others that are there – the Hillwoods, the Hesses, the Conoco-Phillips, a bunch of others – you know, all were pioneers in being among the first companies to go there and help develop the wealth that is contained in the region. So I don't see anything bad here, I think it's quite good.
And my hope is that Baghdad will take a look and say, "You know what, we need to do more of what they're doing." And if they did, I think Iraq would be much better off.
BL: Sure, but the likelihood is that that won't happen.
JJ: Probably not.
BL: So then what's the role of the U.S. government? In order to support American companies or organizations in Kurdistan, what does the U.S. need to do?
JJ: Well, I think one of the most stabilizing aspects of what's going on is the fact that American industry is involved. I think that in itself is a stabilizing influence on the region. And I don't think that the central government in Baghdad or the KRG are going to risk the economic potential that is there in the country and in the region to start some sort of conflict. I could be wrong. I see our presence as very stabilizing.
As a matter of fact, (Kurdistan) President (Massoud) Barzani told me specifically, it's almost a direct quote, that four American companies in Kurdistan are worth two army divisions. That's how much importance they ascribe to American presence in Kurdistan as a stabilizing, confidence-building presence. So the geostrategic implications of American business through USKBC going there is extremely useful, I think.
BL: The way it's been described to me also by Kurdish leaders, is that it gives them an insurance policy: there are no American bases in Kurdistan, even though they're welcome.
JJ: Yeah, you can call it what you want. I call it a stabilizing, reassuring aspect. The U.S. is conscious of the fact that you have some major, major companies, U.S. companies, going there, and the embassy has to provide for that. I mean that's part of our national policy.
BL: Provide for that?
JJ: To provide – to make sure, you know, they are not treated unfairly, that they're not thrown in jail, not on trial or, you know, they don't get subjected to things that they can't defend themselves over.
BL: But the U.S. warning to oil companies - especially to those that have signed the disputed territories - has been: "You're doing this solely at your own risk. This is legally questionable." They have been qualifying their backing. Is that just rhetoric, you think?
JJ: I think governments have to be careful in how they do things. I think the policy of the United States is still to try to work with the central government and try to convince them that there is a better way to do this. But absent that, you know, American companies, oil companies in particular, are well versed in assessing risk. Probably better at it than we are.
BL: The ExxonMobil deal specifically seemed to be a game changer in the history of Kurdistan and also for investment in the region. How would you characterize it?
JJ: When I took my first group (of potential investors) over to Kurdistan, frankly, out of possible 30 or 40 people only about 12 to 15 showed up because the others were unsure of what security was like in Kurdistan. Because they read what they read and then they, you know, think, "This place is...."
For the 13 or 14 who went there, they said, "Wow, this is great, you know?" And then they call all their friends and say, "Boy, you missed it, this is great!" So, once that word gets around, that America has been hampered by its "One Iraq" policy a little bit – and that's why we weren't out in Kurdistan.
As an American it really bothers me to see all these other countries roll in there and sign contracts and everything else when during the war they actually did nothing. They didn't even support us or help us. So it's, for me it's like riding the scale a little bit. And as I said, from an economic standpoint, from a geostrategic standpoint, this is the right thing to do.
BL: What you've been saying is that the "One Iraq" policy has proven to not be adequate for the U.S. interests, and especially for the Kurds. What specifically needs to change and what has been asked for by President Barzani during his visits here with the leadership?
JJ: The "One Iraq" policy is what it is. It's up to the administration, the State Department, to decide whether that's working or not. I'm disappointed in it, to be honest with you.
I thought that we would, you know, have been able to create something that would be far more democratic, in terms of their orientation – in other words, in terms of how they feel about us after everything that's been done. But the behavior of a government which supports, throws its support towards a guy like Assad in Syria and obviously has close dealings with Tehran. That doesn't reflect, I think, either respect or appreciation for what was done. So I'm not wild about the "One Iraq" policy in that respect.
I think it was a good thing to try to do, but if it's not working, then you have to kind of switch vectors and try something that will work. And I think encouraging American business to deal with Iraq is okay. I think calling attention to the opportunities in different regions is also okay, and I think that if you have a particularly welcoming region, like Kurdistan, that's okay as well. And it's a semi-autonomous region; they'll work that out with Baghdad as to what that means and how that's implemented, but I don't have any problem with what we're doing.
In my trip to Turkey, in talking to the Turkish government's most senior officials, they think the American presence in northern Iraq is also a stabilizing function – our economic and presence and presence of business.
BL: They also think that Exxon's there because the U.S. government wants Exxon to be there.
JJ: There will be people who will make that connection. I'm not sure that's the case, but I'm glad they're there.
BL: I'm told the Obama administration is reviewing their policy in Iraq right now.
JJ: Good. You know, if you're gonna sell (Baghdad) F16s and M1 tanks and things like that while they're cozying up to Tehran, you're basically, probably, providing for a transfer of technology that is not in our best interest. I'm of the opinion that we need to hold our horses a little bit and work a little bit more with this Iraqi government to see what their real colors are.
BL: So the U.S. should stop short of supporting an independent Kurdistan?
JJ: No. I don't think that the U.S. should get into advocating for an independent Kurdistan – you know, a breakaway state. I don't think the Kurds are gonna even try that for a long time to come, if ever. But I think that the semi-autonomous regions that they set up has to be an opportunity for us to be able to deal with those regions. I mean, whether it’s the Shiite, or the Sunnis or the Kurds.
BL: In terms of U.S. energy security and U.S. global energy interests, how does Iraq, and the KRG specifically, fit into that policy?
JJ: Iraq will be the one to determine that. But, you know, it's not a good sign for the global community when companies like Exxon and Chevron both kind of say, "It's easier to do business in Kurdistan than it is with Baghdad." That has a chilling effect, you know, globally. And I think Baghdad's gonna have to learn from that.
Energy is a national security issue; it's an international security issue. We have leadership responsibilities in the globe. We are fortunate in this country to have an abundance of energy. We may not have enough of any one thing, but we have more than anybody else in just about everything. And I'm hopeful that getting a more strategic organization around the executive branch in particular, that we can capitalize on this and achieve our potential instead of just, kind of, stumbling around into it like we normally do because we don't have the organization that we need. I think that the U.S. dependence on oil is going to continue to go down as our ability to harvest our own resources increases, and I think that's a good thing.
BL: Does this put the U.S. in a foreign policy conundrum of conflicting priorities? In Kurdistan, there are companies, including major U.S. companies, who want to explore for oil and gas and get that out to the market, especially to Turkey and allies in Europe, especially the natural gas. Whereas the central government in Baghdad says, "Hold on a second, those contracts aren't legitimate."
JJ: We will enter into that discussion within a year, when Exxon and Chevron start producing oil, and then the pipeline system, such as it is, will prove itself to be inadequate. And those things are gonna have to be resolved among capitals, and so on and so forth. But it's obviously a looming problem, and a looming challenge.
But there are regional interests at stake with Turkey, a NATO ally, which wants to diversify its own energy, doesn’t want to be beholden to any one source of energy or to be able to be blackmailed by that source. You can't blame them for wanting to do that. That's something that the United States, as a global power, should respect – and frankly, assist an ally, in my view.
BL: Including direct pipelines?
JJ: In Turkey?
BL: In Turkey. There is very likely a conflict here: you have Turkey's interest, and what they would like in terms of a plentiful and diverse supply of energy; and you have Baghdad, which doesn't want direct pipelines to Kurdistan, especially if they are not under central government control.
JJ: Again, I think these are problems that are going to have to be resolved in capitals. Frankly, I think this matter is so important that ultimately a country like Turkey is going to do what's in its own best interest. They'll be patient with us, listen to us, and they'll say, "Okay, but here's what we're gonna do."
BL: What do you think that will be?
JJ: I think that ultimately they will build a pipeline. I think they will: it's in their national interest. I mean we wouldn't want somebody from across the ocean telling us we can't build a pipeline to Canada. Or from Canada to us. That's a sovereign decision.
There’s a lot of things that have to play out. My main hope would be that Baghdad would understand that their long-term interest lies more with economic dealings with the United States, on a level playing field – and would respect the fact that the Iranian threat is real, and makes their neighborhood much more dangerous. And that supporting dictators like Assad is pretty passé.